Shel Kimen, Theories of Dictatorship, Spring 2003
"Al embarcar en Algeciras, se apiñan en
las barcazas, al costado del barco, un centenar de hombres de distintos
aspectos; al lado de los trajes azules de mahón, blanquean los sombreros de
paja, trajes claros, rostros morenos curtidos por el sol, hombres rubios de
aspecto extranjero y jóvenes mozalbetes de espíritu aventurero. Silenciosos,
dirigen su mirada enigmática al barco que les ha de conducir a Ceuta y momentos
después desfilan rápidos por las escalinatas....
En el barco, en franca camaradería,
comienzan las bromas y distracciones. Sspañoles y extranjeros saltan y ríen
dando al olvido su vida anterior. Parece que vuelven a ser niños; pero los
fuertes vaivenes del barco imponen la formalidad y mientras unos se tumban,
otros en pie dirigen su vista hacia la costa, adonde les lleva su nuevo
destino.
Estos son los futuros
legionarios; muchos de ellos han escrito con su sangre las páginas de este
libro y yo les contemplo con la simpatía de los que van a encaminar sus vidas
juntos" – Francisco Franco, Octubre 1920
"Upon embarking on Algeciras, crowded together in the
hulls, to the flank of the boat, a hundred men of different make-up; next to
the blue suits of Mahón, with whitened straw hats, clear suits, brown faces
tanned by the sun, blond foreigners and young people embody the spirit of
adventure. Quiet, they direct enigmatic glances toward the boat that has lead
them to Ceuta and moments later march quickly up the stairway....
On the boat, in frank camaraderie,
the jokes and distractions begin.... Spaniards and foreigners jump and laugh
forgetting their previous life. It seems they've returned to being young; but
the strong swings of the boat impose formality and while they ease up, others
still direct their sight towards the coast, which carries them to a new
destiny.
These are the future legions; many
of them have written with their blood the pages of this book and I reflect on
them with the affection of those who are going to direct this life together".[1]
– Francisco Franco, October 1920
Spain has always struggled for unity among a complex system of religious values, regional identity (within Spain), and fragmentation within radical, liberal, and conservative political parties. This struggle for unity was visible as early as the 8th century in the ambiguous laws towards Christians and Jews during Muslim rule; the formation Cortes of Castile-Leon in 1188 AD (the first European representative government); the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabelle of Castile, their Inquisition and final expulsion of the remaining Moors with the reclamation of Grenada; the faction politics of the first, second and third republics; the breakdown of the resistance movements and the third republic against Franco during the Spanish Civil War, and Franco's own rise to power.
Francisco Franco wrote the words on the cover of this paper in his personal journal, Diario De Una Bandera (Diary of a Flag), published in 1922, fourteen years before he became El Claudillo of Spain. While his fondness for the military and the nation of Spain is evident, it's hard to understand how such a passionate, and well-written man, could prove to be such a notorious and crude dictator. It's impossible to grasp such a leader as Francisco Franco without looking at the history of Spain's historically fractured political system.
Franco could not have come to such power without this long divided history; however, it's a curious phenomenon that his rule lasted for so long. What was different about Franco's rule than most other leaders of Spain? (He ruled, not as a hereditary King but as a military dictator, hardly challenged, for 31 years).
Was his rule tied to concepts of or desire for unity, and if so, how? What was unique about Franco's style of dictatorship over previous despotic or tyrannical kings and queens, or the relatively short (8 year) dictatorship of Miguel Primo De Rivera? Could this have been prevented by a stronger constitution? (Spain had several between 1812 and Franco's suspension thereof in 1936). Or is it simply a matter of fact that the man with the biggest army wins (for as long as the army supports him)?
It's been said that the Spanish King is a King of Spain's, not a King of Spain, and that Spaniards favor their villages and cities over the national cause.[2] But in order for Spain to earn its place as a European nation, as early as the 1500's (with the decline of feudalism, the development of capitalism, and the consecration of the western nation state), identity formation became a major goal of Spanish rulers. Therefore while Spaniards may favor regionalism, it is a necessary function of Spanish leaders, for diplomatic reasons, to create a semblance of unity (to at the least administer policy and regulate finance and trade with the outside world).
Perhaps because of its strong sense of regionalism, and possibly an attempt to encourage, or seem to encourage unity, Spain was the first European country to engage a representative parliamentary-like advisory to the King, consisting of noblemen, educators, and local townspeople. It's ironic that this early parliament could turn into such a chaotic state ultimately yielding one of the worlds most infamous dictators. It's my suggestions that regionalism and individualism (yielding ideological factions), combined with a strong desire for the chaos to stop, and a chain of lucky accidents, broken promises and lies, brought Franco to power. However, the only reason his dictatorship lasted so long was because of the tremendous and violent force of an exceptionally large and powerful army.
...
It was 711 AD when the Moors first entered Spain with intent to colonize. Though they were successful in both defeating King Roderic and relocating thousands of their own people to Spanish soil, they were less successful in converting Spain's native population to the doctrine of Islam. This is partly because they were outnumbered, but more so because of their ambiguous laws.
"The militant monotheism that infused the Islamic concept of jihad could not tolerate the existence of religious alternatives that recognized neither God's unity nor the inevitability of his judgment. Thus polytheists were given no real choice by their Muslim conquerors but to embrace Islam. The Christians and the Jews were, however, a different matter. Having met the basic monotheistic criterion, their only failure in the eyes of the Muslims was their misinformed, but ultimately tolerable, reluctance to accept Muhammad as the most recent in the long line of prophetic successors to Abraham. This ambiguity in the religious status of the scriptures or 'peoples of the book' led to a certain ambiguity in their legal position within Islamic society as well."[3]
Because they weren't forced to convert, the Christian and Jewish movements were able to grow, however underground, adding momentum to what is called the Reconquista (reconquest) period of Spanish history.
Most of the Iberian Peninsula (what we now know of as Spain) remained under Muslim rule until sometime in the late 13th century. In the early 11th century Pope Alexander tried to help the Spaniards defeat the Muslims in exchange for heavy taxes (the church needed more Christians and the money new believers would bring). While this was somewhat effective in pushing the Muslims further and further south (they had never entirely gained control of the northern region) and created wealth for the papacy, it also proved to create competition within Spain's borders. Pope Alexander helped develop a system of multiple kingdoms, exchanging political favors for cash, consequently dividing the power centers in Spain.
This division of power was then managed by the foundation of the Cortes, a representative body of advisors to the King, established in the late 12th century. The Cortes intended to unify Spain by inviting more people to contribute to the governmental process and pull 'outsiders' or 'factions' in. In the same way the Papacy created Kingdoms of distributed power to gain funds, the kingdoms themselves created parliament to raise and manage wealth. The Cortes served to ease the administration of vast regions, supply local militias, and rationalize taxation.[4] The Cortes was also used by the king to establish validity – of heirs, of wives, and even of a kings right be to king, as was the case of Fernando III (son of Alfonso X) who summoned an assembly at Benavente of bishops, knights and townspeople to settle his right to the throne.[5] While the Cortes did not 'elect' a king, it was used both in the case of Fernando III and also Fernando IV, to gain support and establish validity for hereditary succession. And while like the Papacy, it did succeed in creating wealth and a certain degree of validity; it also caused further fragmentation despite the appearance of unity.
"Representative assemblies had certain traits in common, but each one also had its distinctive characteristics. Thus, whereas the English parliament, consisting of two houses of lords and commons, was a single assembly for the entire realm, the prelates, nobles, and townsmen in the Cortes of Castile-León remained separate entities. From time to time the monarch also convoked the Cortes of Castile and León separately, or convened other limited assemblies of the three estates."[6]
While there were large meetings comprising of many members of society (knights, bishops, nobility, and 'good townspeople') from every district, the King also had separate meetings with separate districts, often manipulating ones agenda against the other, promising power for favors, and unwittingly encouraging regionalism. In the same way the papacy created competing kingdoms to gain approval and funds, so too did the kings create competing towns within kingdoms via the Cortes. By the time of Alfonso XI regional Cortes were occurring, adding to both democratization and fragmentation.
Many have argued that Ferdinand and Isabella first brought a sense of unity to Spain. They are heralded as "bringing Spain into the Modern world" by advancing trade, setting up centralized institutions, advancing science and exploration, breaking up the aristocracy, and attempting to centralize banking with a universal coin system. (England didn't centralize its bank until 1694). However they created a false unity yielding socially devastating consequences, and in a certain sense, paved the way for future dictators.
"Spanish fascism was nostalgic
for the "Catholic majesties" of the 18th century, [and for] Ferdinand
and Isabella (Discovery of the New World, driving out the Moors). The Falangist
badge featured the emblem of the Catholic Kings..."[7]
Ferdinand and Isabella are often regarded as heroes for pushing the moors out of Spain with the conquering of Grenada and for sending Columbus to discover 'the new world.' However, they also organized the council of the Inquisition in 1478, tortured and killed infidels and expelled over 100,000 Jews,[8] after systematically removing their rights for the preceding 15 years.[9] Statistics vary on the actual number exiled and or killed, but it is said that 165,000 emigrated, 50,000 converted, and 20,000 to 265,000 died. Ferdinand and Isabella rationalized the inquisition as God's will. However God's will was certainly encouraged via political will to unify a fragmented Spain and secure the monarchy.
This political will is evident first by their marriage, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, an attempt to unite a Spain severely divided and to secure both their positions, not just in Spain but in the growing international world of nation states. Recognizing the weaknesses of regionalized Cortes they established the Council of State, the Council of Justice, and the Council of Finance, in other words, centralized government to regulate foreign affairs, royal power, and public funds. However, they did not invent these ideas, rather capitalized on existing institutions, particularly on the well functioning government of Aragon (which went awry with their intervention and contributed significantly to the later separatist movements).
Their attempt to break up the aristocracy was not as they said, to better life for the poor. It was part of a European trend to give rise to the merchant class (as the merchants had agreed to pay taxes in exchange for protection from the Feudal Lords) and advance the creation of wealth. The peasants were hardly better off, until hundreds of years later, because of this break-up. Additionally, because the merchants had arranged to pay taxes, everyone had to pay taxes, including the aristocracy who didn't technically own much (they merely guarded the kings property) and the peasants who had a hard time finding work once their land had been taken from the lords and the countryside abandoned. The break-up of the aristocracy was hardly noble.
Even with their marriage and the pseudo-creation of a national identity via centralized government and the religious enforcements of the inquisition, Spain remained fragmented. Most of the power for Ferdinand and Isabella effected Castile, where Isabella controlled the Cortes. Aragon, however, maintained a strong and independent Cortes with a separate constitution. Additionally some say that the repression of Moors and Jews, or any non-Christians, led to insincere conversions and seeded future rebellions. The class distinctions grew and the separatist movement evolved. Thus, Spain was yet to be even remotely unified and the death toll of their reign far outweighs any international colonies that they later lost anyway.
In 1806, King Ferdinand VII was 'invited' to stay with Napoleon and treated quite well. Napoleon used this time, with Ferdinand safely distracted in France, to invade Spain and put his brother King Joseph (or Bottle Joe as the Spaniards called him) on the throne in 1807. In 1808 Charles IV and Ferdinand VII resigned the crown, with little hesitation.
Spain was for the first time without a king and the people rose in rebellion. The people were led by charismatic generals, which began Spain's long tradition of the "political general." This is an important happening that would dramatically affect Spain for the next 150 years, and significantly impacted the civil war and Franco's rise to power. When Ferdinand returned (to a population angry by his betrayal), tyrannical and spoiled from life with Napoleon, the generals divided in favor for and against the king. This is also significant. Those who sided the king made it their business to be further involved in politics and from that point on Kings tended to favor the army over the church.
In some sense this delighted the progressives (as it led to a more distinct line already being drawn between church and state), but it also led to harsher military rule and angered the traditionalists. Political parties fragmented as the traditionalists who supported the monarchy and the church were divided, as were the progressives who favored a liberal policy on the church but detested iron fist rule. Additionally, the generals who didn't support the king's return went off on their own to develop additional resistance movements, which ultimately resulted in the final breakdown of the monarchy (the generals gave Alfonso XIII bad advice which toppled his regime) and brought rise to the dictatorial governments of Miguel Primo De Rivera and Franco.
In 1812 the constitution of Cadiz was established, and it makes sense that this was a particularly liberal constitution that both outlined separation of powers and limited roles for the church and king. This constitution also marked the first official republic of Spain and would be subject for debate and war until 1978. Many Spaniards regarded the constitution as "the handwork of a radical minority, divorced from any representative opinion in Spain."[10] While it's true that a minority of radicals called the Cortes and drew up the constitution, history has proven that the demands of the constitution "for division of power, for uniform modern laws, for civil equality, and the curtailment of corporate privilege" was actually a common desire of a large and diverse population.[11]
In order to appeal to the conservatives of Spain, the committee tainted the new laws as merely a revival of old laws that "made our ancestors free men."[12] However this was not true. "Their constitution embodied a radical fear of the executive and an extreme division of powers that could have no conceivable medieval precedent."[13] The constitution was supposed to unite Spain under one rule, but within its very creation it claimed to do one thing (re-enact old laws that made Spain free) while it covertly achieved other things (severe limits on the power of the monarchy). This inevitably caused further riffs between conservatives and liberals, but perhaps more significantly, within the liberal party itself, unclear of its own agenda.
Additionally, by limiting the King too much, as they did, the liberals had made a fatal mistake. "Their treatment of the king as a constitutional wild best inevitably condemned the constitution to destruction on the King's return."[14] Also, because they sought to so completely unify Spain, with a centralized government mirrored by regionally identical mini-governments, they also limited local power too much, adding fire to the regionalist and nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque Provinces. The constitution was also more interested in clear and strict property rights, which infringed upon the Mesta (cattlemen's association) allowing individuals to enclose their private property and forbid grazing (a previously common practice). They also gave away half the land to war veterans and peasants, undermining a real-estate market necessary for a liberal economy.
They alienated the king, oppressed local identity, antagonized the pastoral community, undermined to bourgeoisie (by destroying their real-estate market) and set the now freed peasants up for failure (with a limited upper class to support their arts and crafts or buy the food from their new land). This is not to say the constitution was a complete disaster, but it is easy to see how each of the above entities might evolve into a movement of its own and created roadblocks to the possibility of a unified Spain. It was a constitution for the people that the people hated[15] that turned into chaos and civil war.
In 1823 King Ferdinand, who had at first accepted the Constitution of 1812, annoyed by the severe limitations, annulled all legislation and became absolute ruler. While many liberals call this period "the Ominous Decade" he and the people found "authoritarianism welcomed after revolutionary anarchy."[16] The military was "purified" (cleaned of rebels) and journalists were censored. He was not especially a tyrant, but he did all he could to promote royal, absolute power. It likewise follows that the constitution of 1837 was once again quite progressive, though not as radical as the constitution of 1812 in that the King regained more political power, as did the church. The constitution of 1845 was even more conservative, followed by another extraordinarily liberal constitution in 1876.
And in 1923 when General Miguel Primo De Rivera staged a military coup to become Spain's first official Dictator, he swore to uphold the constitution, after a "brief parenthesis"[17] (suspension of all rights) to clean out the bad politicians and restore order. But by 1925 he was already suggesting a new constitution and by 1926 critics knew he was incapable of this. But even as a dictator Rivera was unable to achieve unity for Spain, which is to somewhat imply that unity and dictatorship do not necessarily go hand in hand.
Rivera encountered similar struggles as those who created the constitution of Cadiz (1812). He made promises to the separatists that he later denied, he proclaimed loyalty to a king he would not obey (the king and many citizens wanted a quick return to the 1876 constitution), he offended the bourgeoisie with a favor towards private aristocratic landholders and at the same time offered the poor strange and bizarre social services (like the state repurchase of pawned linens). Rivera craved an old Spain, a feudal Spain, but a feudal Spain that treated it's workers "with dignity," while simultaneously believing in the importance of social hierarchy and the rule of kings. Unfortunately for Rivera, there were not enough landowners to support his endeavor and the separatists quickly realized he would not grant the wishes he had promised them. Additionally, his mission to treat the workers with dignity was not at all practical. It's not surprising that in 1929 he was overthrown and exiled, and by 1930 yet another republic formed. This one lost its King.
On April 14, 1930, King Alfonso XIII stated the following:
"The elections held on Sunday clearly reveal that I do not today have the love of my people [...]. I could find effective means to maintain my royal prerogatives by force against those who would combat them. But I want to resolutely put aside whatever would pit one of my countrymen against another in a fratricidal civil war [...]. I hope I know the authentic and genuine expression of the collective conscience, and as I speak to the nation I have deliberately separated the Army from the royal power, and I remove myself from Spain, which I recognize as the unique mistress of her own destiny."
Alfonso said the above to spare he and his family from death. He also said that though he was leaving he would always be the King of Spaniards, not without leaving behind a sizeable mess. Largely he had to leave because of the incredible power and confidence he bestowed to the military. He often neglected to listen to his intellectual and religious advisors in favor of military opinion. His most famous error in this vein was the arrest and execution of two young army captains' who pre-maturely declared that the new republic had formed. They marched into the streets, much to the dismay of the generals who considered themselves the only ones entitled to make such grand announcements. Unfortunately, not many people followed, as it wasn't yet time for the Republic, still waiting for the right moment to rise. Though it was a relatively small event with less than famous soldiers, the generals, trumped by the pre-mature pronouncement, convinced the already angry king (furious that he was proclaimed irrelevant), to condemn and kill the students, against the advice of numerous religious leaders, councilmen, and even international pleas'. Alfonso was quoted unofficially as stating, "An example is necessary." Of course this only enticed Spain's republicans, a substantial majority, that another example was necessary, "Down with the King!" they shouted. With Alfonso forced out, elections were held, and a left-leaning republic formed. And in the end the two young officers, Captains Fermin Galan and Angel Garcia Hernandez, though dead, did in fact bring on the new republic.
The new government set up quickly and relatively smoothly, they had been preparing for years. Niceto Alcalá Zamora was chosen as the head of state and he selected Manuel Azana (credited with having the brains behind the "bloodless" revolution which overthrew the King) to be Head of War (a somewhat ironic title given Azana's pacifist nature). The republic set out to fix all those sources of fragmentation and disarray already mentioned – separatists, the relationship between church and state, social values, agrarian reform, the role of the military, and the disputes between landowners, merchants and peasants.
Its first order of business was the separatists. Barcelona was the largest supporter of the new republic, possibly why it proved so successful, and was also the largest voice in the separatist movement. It supported and elected a government it had hoped would free it. The government did in fact grant Catalan autonomy in 1932, which only prompted the Basques, Galacia, and Valencia to ask for the same.
In social terms some advances were made, especially for women. In the 1931 Constitution women won the right to vote and also the right to be elected to any public office. In 1932 laws on civil marriage and divorce were introduced. They recognized divorce by mutual consent and the right of women to custody of children. At the time, Spain was the most socially advanced country in Europe. In 1936 abortion was legalized in Catalonia – a severe blow to the Catholic Church. A more significant blow to the church was that of allowing the public freedom of religion, which increased the tension between liberal notions of progress and the traditionalists who remained loyal to the King and Catholicism.
Agrarian reform was another large issue. At first, in order to give land to everyone, the new government excessively divided the land into small plots that did not provide their owners a return sufficient to live on. There were also a number of very large estates, generally in the hands of absentee landlords, which at times gave their owners a locally economically dominant position, which disturbed the socialist tendency of the republic. Finally, there were problems derived from different classes of lease,[18] also troublesome for the socialist factions.
The Republic couldn't find a plan that appeased
the socialist party (which dominated the republic) without horrifying the
aristocracy, until in March of 1932, Marcelino Domingo, the Minister of
Agriculture, presented a complex plan and an Institute of Agrarian Reform to
administer it. However, the excessively bureaucratic character of the
Institute, the lack of data that would make it possible to know which lands belonged
to the same owner and the lack of advance studies concerning the quality and
fertility of the land made it impossible to carry out the plan efficiently.
Because of the too slow changes agrarian violence increased in the Spanish
countryside, with protests resulting in violent deaths both of peasants and
civil guards.
The army was another problem. Because a majority of the army represented monarchists Azana proposed a peaceful 'purge' which offered all the soldiers and officers the opportunity to swear fidelity to the Republic or retire with full pay. First, this was a time consuming and expensive process. Additionally, while it offered full pay to those who wished to opt out, it created a situation whereby thousands of anti-republic soldiers had free time (and inclination) to join the growing number of militias which supported Franco, opposed Franco, opposed the republic, or all three. Additionally most of the people that left were young soldiers who preferred civilian life and those that stayed were older, clung to ideas of old Spain, and waited patiently for opportunities of insurrection, in eager support of any number of charismatic, political generals. The republican army weakened dramatically, which hindered its ability to defend itself both against Franco and the radical left (communists, socialists, and anarchists) during the civil war.
Because the mostly socialist Republic failed to meet it's promises quickly a rightist government was elected in 1933, under the leadership of Alejandro Lerroux. Many argue that the rightist government wanted to destroy the republic and replace it with a military dictatorship. This assertion is questionable. While it's true that the likes of Miguel Primo De Rivera rose from this regime, as did Franco, it's documented numerous times that Lerroux, though questionable in character himself and involved in a number of financial scandals, wanted only a stable republic. His promotions of Franco throughout the period that liberals call the "Black Biennium" (1933 – 1935) were always offered on the condition that Franco would follow the rules and goals of the republic. Franco always promised to 'behave', but as history shows, he broke all those and many more promises. And though it was a quite horrible mistake, frustrated with Franco, Lerroux sent him to the Canary Islands as a sort of internal exile to keep him away from politics. This only allowed Franco to strengthen his army, build connections and allies, and support a takeover (at the time it's unclear if Franco saw himself as the leader of such a movement).
Ultimately the right had made a series of political blunders that forced Lerroux to call for new elections in 1935 and once again the left returned to power, this time under the leadership of Manuel Azana. Among Azana's chief concerns was the divergence between the Republic and a sect of socialists who wanted nothing to do with the republic, which factored significantly into the civil war. He felt this riff within the liberal movement could cause the breakdown of the republic, and for the most part he was correct. What's also significant about this fear, and most documentation of Azana and the time, is that though it was a concern, he gravely misunderstood the agenda and potential impact of these anti-republic socialists. He and many others scarcely mention the anarchists or the communists and the complex relationships within the movement.
The Second Spanish Republic lasted from April 14th 1931 to July 18th, 1936 (military uprising) or April 1st, 1939 (republican defeat). Technically General Francisco Franco was head of state by 1936, formalized in 1937, but it wasn't until 1939 that the republic completely fell. As in 1812 and under Rivera, the problems that led to the civil war and ultimately brought Franco to power revolved around fragmentation of religion, class, political parties, and social values.
The Spanish Civil War has been written about perhaps more than any other civil war in history. It was an eruption of numerous issues that have consumed Spain's struggle for freedom and identity since the 700's. It is not my intent to chronicle this war, but rather highlight a few of the key issues that perhaps encouraged the rise of a tyrannical dictator and made Franco such an important, however dark, figure in Spanish history.
If we look at what's been discussed so far Spain has been forever without a unified national identity (perhaps this is it's identity). The civil war was, in addition to a response to international politics, a national clash of a 1500-year struggle to define Spanish culture. Militias and armies divided into three camps, all of which had multiple internal and competing agendas.
On one hand there were the Nationalists, ultimately led by Franco, and consisted of the Falange (originally led by Jose Antonio Primo De Rivera, Miguel's son), some strands of monarchists, as well as nationalists. The nationalists sought to create a unified Spain that the republic (in its eyes) had failed to do, and by any means necessary, specifically force. The republican army consisted of, of course, republican loyalists, but also international militias invested in a democracy, as well as socialists, other strands of monarchists, and the Catholic CEDA who were loyal to the republic but not a leftist republic. (In 1933 the right, aided by the CEDA, succeeded in ousting the left in favor of Lerroux, though this was all still part of "the Republic"). The third camp was revolutionary. They both opposed the republic (for moving too slowly) and also opposed Franco. It was an extraordinarily complex situation.
First there were different definitions buzzing around about what the "Republic" even meant. To some it was a way of conducting politics (as it was for the CEDA and even some of the revolutionary factions). To others it was the existing Republic, whose figurehead was Azana. For them, opposing the Republic meant opposing the leftist regime of Azana. Therefore it was possible for everyone, or at least every party (including the Republic) to oppose the Republic, rendering astonishing confusion internally and more so in the foreign press.
While opposing the republic meant different things to different groups and individuals created confusion, likewise, the combination of leftists, socialists, and conservatives in two of the three major factions added confusion. The Catholic CEDA accused the socialists within the republic of defeating democracy by use of violence, who were distinct from the socialists of the revolutionary movement who never claimed to be a part of the republic in the first place. (Incidentally, both movements, the republic and the revolutionaries, claimed to be revolutionary).
All of this was further confounded by international speculation that over-simplified the events in the foreign press as a fight for democracy against fascism led by a dictator, Franco. Consequently, the anti-republic (non-fascist) revolutionary movements were either absorbed into the republican army, or imprisoned, exiled, or killed.[19] The breakdown of the anarchists, socialists and communists has a number of different histories, depending on who tells it. Orwell tells us the communists, specifically Russia, sold the movement to the Republic. Fernsworth, a journalist living in Spain at the time and sympathetic with Azana's republic barely mentions this third group, though briefly mentions Russia's involvement. Robinson, who wrote "The Origins of Franco's Spain," a case study of the rightist movements, backs up some of Orwell's tale but gives no credit to Russia for intervention and aid, which is an important point. To overlook foreign influence in the Spanish civil war is to miss a large part of it.
It's also a mistake to say that the civil war in Spain was a war against fascism, as Robinson claims the anti-republican movements finally agreed to believe. Though Franco and the Nationalist movement sought and ultimately enforced authoritarian control, the movement began less as fascism and more as marshal law. The politics came later in Franco's movement. It is also a mistake to equate the term dictator with fascism, as Ferdinand and Isabella or Ferdinand (1823) could be perceived of as more fascists than Miguel Primo de Rivera, the countries first dictator. Part of our inability to truly understand the Spanish civil war is embedded in our inability to articulate the tensions outside the dogmatism associated with political parties and words like fascism, dictator, democracy, and so on.
Nonetheless, Franco, almost accidentally, was able to capitalize on the various weaknesses of the competing multi-textured armies. "The republicans had come near to destroying themselves in achieving a unified direction for the war. [The Nationalists] were saved from this fate, not by any lack of competing cliques and ideologies, but of the primacy of the soldiers."[20] The nationalists chose to win by military force before tackling the issue of politics. Their only position was one against communism, traitors (those they considered anti-Spain), and anarchy. Franco actually refused to stage a coup a few times earlier because he said he would only rise if it were for Spain, or if anarchy ensued. And Robinson also alleges that Franco only went along with the final uprising of the Nationalists against the Republic because the other generals told him they would do it without him. More likely, the other generals needed him, as all other suitable candidates were either out of the picture or too weak.
The most notable of the deleted candidates was Sanjuro,
Spain's most popular general. He tried to stage a coup early on, failed, and
was exiled to Portugal where he crafted numerous future plans. Upon his secret
return to seize the state, he allegedly died in an accidental plane crash. Jose
Antonio, leader of the Falange was executed. Goded, another general hoping to
seize power made a botched attempt at a coup, was captured and shot. The last
Candidate, Mola, another general, had achieved no great military victories and
was therefore just too weak to stake claim on the Nationalist party. Franco
became the dictator not because of his inspiring vision or brilliant
strategies, but rather because he was the slowest to try and stage a coup. He
also had the strongest and most reliable army, an important feature of any
dictatorship or insurrection.
Franco was born in December of 1892. He was the second child of a middle-class family of sailors and began his military career in the Infantry at the Academy of Toledo. When he was thirty years old he was in charge of the Legion and continued his professional promotion; he was the youngest Brigade general in Europe. In 1916 he was a commander. After the triumph of the right (Lerroux and the CEDA) in the elections of 1933, Franco was promoted to Division general. During the revolution in Asturias in 1934 he crushed the worker's movement. Lerroux further rewarded him with the command of the military forces in Morocco where he built the strongest army in Spain. By 1936, Franco was chief of staff for the military. In July 1936, Franco lead a revolt against the Popular Front, Azana's left side of the republic that had just regained control, and was recognized by Germany and Italy as the legitimate ruler of Spain. The French and the British recognized his government as legitimate in February of 1939, and the United States America recognized Franco as head of Spain just two months later.
By this account the republic that rewarded Franco gave him enough power, too much in fact, which actually brought about its demise. Lerroux was conservative, but he believed all parties had a voice in government. Franco was a product of the rightist republican government, which was neither strong enough nor clear enough in its aim to guard against the rise of an internal, tyrannical leader. The leftist republic took too long to organize its army and make peace with the anti-republic non-fascist revolutionaries. It was unable to solve the abundance of national problems facing all classes of Spanish society quickly enough. Franco became dictator because of timely accidents, political in-fighting, probably a national need for stability, and an extraordinarily strong army backed by a sea of political generals who had been enjoying positions of power and influence since 1808.
The costs were extreme.
Estimates of people killed during the Civil war vary, ranging from 100,00 to 1,200,000 (including foreign militia and civilians). Most statistics place Republican deaths higher than Nationalist deaths, both in combat and executions. Estimates of people executed after Franco came to power range from 22,000 to 359,000, which includes death in prison, and from mal-nourishment. [21]
Franco took the name El Claudillo (the leader) as a nod to Mussolini and Hitler's Fascism, and kept the Party as The Falange (the original Fascist Party of Spain). He sent a large infantry to help Hitler and ruled a single party system offering one religion, Catholicism, though he was not entirely Fascist and changed his tune somewhat over time. He was not obsessed with racial issues (as is defined in the term Fascism). He was open (later in the 50's and 60's) to foreign influence and certain diplomatic issues, understood the need to raise capital and therefore relinquish (or at least promise to relinquish) certain authoritative control. He did not always comply with his own agreements (with the UN, with UNESCO, with the United States), but that's another issue. His relationship to capitalism is interesting. Most Fascists have supported capitalism and development for the good of their people, their nation. Franco, however, would have been satisfied to let everyone stay poor and keep capitalism out, but he eventually conceded to international and internal pressure (specifically pressure mounting by united student/worker fronts). To be technical, Franco was a Clero-Fascist, a leader that is both dictator and either a prophet or canonized by the national religion. He was in fact a self-appointed canon of the church. Issues of race and capitalism were relatively unimportant to him (except as mentioned because of external and internal pressure). He later distanced himself from Mussolini and Hitler, to gain favor from the United States, England, and France (to earn the much needed money from such alliances) and softened, however slightly, some internal policies.
This is not to minimize Franco's cruel and unusually harsh system of rule. Specific tales of Franco's escapades as a military dictator range from the absurd to horrific, and are as complicated as the multiple factions vying for power during the civil war. He constantly removed, and often imprisoned, exiled or killed suspicious advisors. He ordered the army to violently crush numerous student rebellions, which were frequent in the 1950's. There are dozens of tales of armed guards seizing classrooms and brutalizing students and teachers. A poll in 1956 at Madrid University showed that 70% of the students opposed the regime. However 60% divided between favor for a new republic vs. that of a monarchy, an ever-familiar political struggle within Spain and one of the reasons things have historically moved so quickly and so slowly. Meanwhile, Freedom of religion was replaced with a return to national Catholicism. Freedom of speech was replaced with censored media. Freedom of association was replaced with a single party rule, and those who went outside the party were imprisoned, exiled, or killed. Torture was especially popular and people debated over the most popular types. Some victims were hung off poles by their wrists with weights attached to their ankles, so they would swing when flogged until unconscious. Others were dipped in cold water before being flogged. Others were tossed into streams when unconscious and when revived beaten again. Some were stabbed with pins and blades repeatedly. Many were burned alive.
Under Franco Spain suffered hunger crises, medical shortages, and continued it's history of failing agrarian policy. There were severe shortages in food, medical supplies, and capital, which at first Franco seemed not to mind. Abortion became illegal again, marriages had to be performed by priests, and the languages and displays of culture from the separatists regions were banned, particularly Catalan which had been granted autonomy and was a particularly active opponent of Franco. By the 1950's, though the economy began to improve slightly and Franco's anti-communist ideology erased some of the memory of his pre-war fascist connections, Spain still suffered from lack of food and medical supplies, and meaningful political change was not permitted. Strikes were still illegal, censorship still enforced, and the armed forces still absorbed a huge portion of the government budget. The main body of the church hierarchy remained conservative and political dissent was still punished by prison sentences.
It's then a curious phenomenon that his rule lasted for so long.
So much of Spain's history has revolved around tensions between the individual, the community and the state. Religion, specifically Catholicism (after Ferdinand and Isabella ousted everyone else) was very important to a large number of Spaniards. However, most would rather have freedom to choose than a unified national religion from force. And though the Spanish are very proud people "Of Spain" it's important to remember the earlier, historical use of the "Of Spain's," indicating that Spaniards live a dual local and national identity. Certainly Franco initiated no wonderful new public policy, in fact he was quite naïve in this area and didn't care much for his people (though over and over again he cared for Spain, for god, and for stability).
Franco's reign probably would not have been effected by a constitution, as he recognized no authority but his own. Regardless of how one had written the constitution of 1876 or 1931 it is unlikely to have deterred him. Additionally, while he later succumbed to certain aspects of international pressure, Franco followed most rules as he saw fit. He joined UNESCO and did not change his one-religion, and religion in school's policy (as UNESCO members are required to be open and free). He was admitted to the United Nations regardless of his cruel and violent treatment of prisoners and series of international war crimes. He got money from the United States in exchange for allowing the U.S. to build military bases, though he did not subscribe to US policy that our allies must be free and democratic. (Obviously the United States, the UN, and UNESCO should also be held accountable for not enforcing these agreements). Nonetheless, neither a constitution nor foreign involvement played much of a role in how Franco treated the Spanish people. It is however possible that at each of these turns, the people of Spain caught enough glimmer of hope to "hold out" and wait a little longer for foreign aid in removing the dictator. It's possible that they did not rise against him because of the constant, anticipated hope of external intervention. It's possible that carefully timed foreign relationships helped to keep him in power for so long.
It's also plausible that the 17 years of chaos from the Miguel Primo De Rivera's dictatorship in 1923 to the end of the civil war in 1939, wore down Spain's citizens to such a degree that they were too emotionally tired to resist. Or potentially they were relieved (at first) to have peace, even under the heavy hand of a cruel dictator, though I have yet to see this documentation. There is documentation that people welcomed the authoritarian ruler King Ferdinand (1823-1833) for similar reasons. "The King gave the peace desired by the intelligent and sought by the prudent."[22] People could also have been too physically weak to fight back, lacking medical supplies and food. At one point Franco rationed 1/8 of a liter of olive oil to each "poor worker" family. Although the people mocked him relentlessly, this time calling him "Francisco Octavo De Litro,"[23] they did not rebel. Additionally, because of the political mess of the civil war most factionary parties, notwithstanding censorship and imprisonment, had difficulty gaining momentum because of lost trust and meager resources depleted during the war. This probably also lengthened his stay.
It's feasible that all of the above-mentioned reasons contributed to Franco's longevity. Realistically though, Franco's only real long-term claim to El Claudillo stems from military power, brute force, and iron fist, simple rules of censorship, rationing, religion and the supremacy of the army. He was far and away Spain's most resourceful and scrupulous military leader amassing the largest, loyal, army. He had the support of other generals, and at the least was most feared. It's said that no one could refuse an order from Franco. He would merely shake his fist and pound on the table and scream threats, relentlessly, until one would comply with his wishes. The man with the strongest army does in fact usually win.
Toward the end of the decade, some of Franco's former supporters (some in the church, some in the Movimiento) began to recognize that Spain must change (towards democracy) and though he had been ill for a long time, his death in 1975 was well timed with growing public displays of dissatisfaction.
After Franco's death Juan Carlos de Borbón y Borbón became King with a parliamentary government. The government's first act was to vote itself out in favor of a free election and wrote a new constitution, adopted in 1978, which begins.
The Spanish Nation, desiring to establish justice, liberty, and security, and to promote the well-being of all its members, in the exercise of its sovereignty proclaims its will to: guarantee democratic coexistence within the Constitution and the laws in accordance with a just economic and social order; consolidate a state of law which insures the rule of law as the expression of the popular will; protect all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, their cultures and traditions, languages, and institutions; promote the progress of culture and the economy to insure a dignified quality of life for all; establish an advanced democratic society; and collaborate in the strengthening of peaceful relations and effective cooperation among all the peoples of the earth.
There are many important aspects to this constitution which may guard against some of the troubles of Spain's past, primarily rules about emergency rule (Article 55 and 116), prohibited laws (Article 83), emergency laws (Article 86), and the vote of confidence and what to do if confidence is not granted (Articles 112 and 113). [See Appendix A for Article text]. [24] All of these laws deal directly with how power is attained, the conditions that require emergency rule, and what effects emergency rule can have on the constitution. While Spain has used the "vote of confidence" for a long time, the new constitution has added what happens when a vote of no confidence is achieved. Not just how the existing leader should step down, but who and how a new leader can step in. It explicitly states that no law created during emergency rule can override the existing constitution and now law can ever permanently render a past law illegal.
It's also interesting that instead of describing a "separation of powers" Spain's new constitution features a "co-operation of powers," indicating that government should work together, despite different ideological views. Fear and mistrust in Spain has lead to numerous internal hostile take-overs and radical alternations between liberal and conservative parties. In 1978 Spain seemed to take a more moderate philosophy for the first time in its history, which seems to have tempered its politics. The constitution has been in effect for 25 years, which is a good start.
Bibliography
Carr, Raymond. Spain 1808 – 1939. Oxford: At The Claredon Press. 1966.
Fernsworth, Lawrence. Spain's Struggle For Freedom. Boston: Beacon Press. 1957.
Orwell, George. Homage to Catalonia. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company.1952.
Primo De Rivera, Jose Antonio. Selected Writings. Roots of the Right: Readings in Fascist, Racist, Elitist Ideology. Edited. George Steiner. London: Harper Torchbooks. 1972.
Ratcliff, Dillwyn Fritschel. Prelude to Franco; Political Aspects of the Dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera. New York: Las Americas Pub. Co. 1957.
Robinson, Richard A.H. The Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right, the
Republic and Revolution, 1931-1936. Great Britain: David &
Charles/Newton Abbott. 1970.
Appendix A
Article 55 [Emergency, Siege, Terrorism]
(1) The rights recognized in Articles 17, 18 (2) and (3), 19, 20 (1)(a) and (d) and (5), 21, 28 (2), and Article 37 (2) may be suspended when a state of emergency or siege is declared under the terms provided in the Constitution. Article 17 (3) is exempted from that which was established previously in the event of the declaration of a state of emergency.
(2) An organic law may determine the manner and the cases in which, in an individual manner and with the necessary judicial intervention and adequate parliamentary control, the rights recognized in Article 17 (2) and 18 (2) and (3) may be suspended for certain persons with respect to investigations having to do with the activities of armed bands or terrorist elements.
The unwarranted or abusive utilization of the powers recognized in said organic law will result in criminal responsibility as a violation of the rights and liberties recognized by the laws.
Article 83 [Prohibited Laws]
Basic laws may in no case do the following:
A) Authorize the modification of the basic laws;
B) Make provision for the enactment of norms with retroactive character.
Article 86 [Decree-Laws]
(1) In the case of extraordinary and urgent necessity, the Government may issue provisional legislative decisions which shall take the form of decree-laws and which may not affect the regulation of the basic institution of the State, the rights, duties, and liberties of the citizens which are regulated in Title I, the systems of Autonomous Communities, or the general electoral Law.
(2) The Decree-laws must be immediately submitted for debate and voting by the entire House of Representatives of Deputies convoked for that purpose, if it is not already in session, within a period of thirty days after their promulgation. The House of Representatives must expressly declare within that period its approval or repeal, for which purpose the Regulation shall establish a special and summary procedure.
(3) During the period established in the foregoing paragraph, the Parliament may treat them as draft laws by emergency procedure.
Article 112 [Vote of Confidence]
The President of the Government, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, may pose before the House of Representatives the question of confidence on his program or on a declaration of general policy. Confidence shall be taken as granted when the absolute majority of the deputies vote for it.
Article 113 [Motion of Censure, Vote of No-Confidence]
(1) The House of Representatives may require political responsibility from the Government by means of the adoption by an absolute majority of a motion of censure.
(2) The motion of censure must be proposed by at least one-tenth of the Deputies and must include a candidate to the office of the Presidency of the Government.
(3) The motion of censure cannot be voted on until five days after its presentation. During the first two days of this period, alternative motions may be presented.
(4) If the motion of censure is not approved by the House of Representatives, its signers cannot present another during the same period of sessions.
Article 116 [Alarm, Emergency, Siege]
(1) An organic law shall regulate the states of alarm, emergency, and siege and the corresponding competences and limitations.
(2) The state of alarm shall be declared by the Government, by means of a decree agreed upon by the Council of Ministers, for a maximum period of fifteen days informing the House of Representatives, which has convened immediately for that purpose and without whose authorization the period cannot be extended. The decree shall determine the territorial area to which the effects of the declaration shall be excluded.
(3) The state of emergency shall be declared by the Government by means of a Decree agreed upon in the Council of Ministers after authorization by the House of Representatives. The authorization and proclamation of a state of emergency must expressly determine its purposes, the territorial area to which it is extended and its duration, which cannot exceed thirty days but which may be extended for a like period with the same requirements.
(4) The state of siege shall be declared by the absolute majority of the House of Representatives at the exclusive proposal by the Government. The House of Representatives shall determine its territorial scope, duration, and conditions.
(5) The House of Representatives may not be dissolved while any of the states contained in the present article are in effect, the Chambers being automatically convoked if they are not in a period of sessions. Their functioning, like that of the other constitutional powers of the State, may not be interrupted during the effectiveness of these states.
In the event that the House of Representatives has been dissolved or its mandate has expired if one of the situations exists which leads to one of the aforementioned states, the competences of the House of Representatives shall be assumed by its Permanent Deputation.
(6) The declaration of the states of alarm, emergency, and siege shall not modify the principle of the responsibility of the Government or its agents as recognized in the Constitution and in the laws.
[1] Franco, Francisco. Diario De Una Bandera. Trans. Shel Kimen. 1922 / 2003. <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/2679/pagetmp2.htm>
[2] Fernsworth, Lawrence. Spain's Struggle For Freedom. Boston: Beacon Press. 1957.
[3] Wolf, Kenneth Baxter. Christian Martyrs in Muslim Spain. 1988. <http://libro.uca.edu/martyrs/martyrs.htm>
[4] O'Callaghan, Joseph F. The Origins of the Cortes, Chapter 1. The Coretes of Castile-Leon. 1989. <http://libro.uca.edu/cortes/cortes.htm>
[5] O'Callaghan. Chapter 5.
[6] O'Callaghan.
Chapter 1.
[7] Hood, Stewart and Litza Jansz. Fascism for Beginners. <http://vander.hashish.com/articles/misc/fascismforbeginners.html>
[8]
Marcus, Jacob. The Jew in the Medieval World:
A Sourcebook. New York: JPS, 1938. p51-55
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/jewish/1492-jews-spain1.html>
[9] Lea, henry Charles. Origin and Establishment: The Jews and the Conversos. A History of the Inquisition of Spain. Volume 1. 1905. <http://libro.uca.edu/lea1/1lea.htm>
[10] Carr, Raymond. Spain 1808 – 1939. Oxford: At The Claredon Press. 1966. p94.
[11] Carr. p94.
[12] Carr. p96
[13] Carr. p97.
[14] Carr. p97.
[15] Carr. p141.
[16] Carr. p146.
[17] Carr. p564.
[18] Marcia, Ramon Puche. Agrarian Reforms. The Problems of The Republic. 2000-2002. <http://www.guerracivil1936.galeon.com/problems3.htm>
[19] Orwell, George. Homage to Catalonia. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company.1952.
[20] Carr. p673.
[21] Secondary Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century. 2002. <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat3.htm>
[22] Carr. p146.
[23] Fernsworth. p337.
[24] Constitution of Spain. 1978. <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/2445/sp00000_.html>